Grand Strategy: The Challenges and Opportunities with China’s Rise
JA Morrison | LSE
Simulation 4
22 March 2021
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Background
In our previous simulations, we dealt with immediate, pressing concerns. In the first simulation, we haggled over the terms of trade in ongoing negotiations. In the second simulation, we faced the pressing public health challenge of a global pandemic that quickly became an economic and political crisis. And, in the third simulation, we grappled with the timeless but acute questions of rights, identities, and membership in our global and local communities.
In this last simulation, we will try our hand at long-term, strategic planning. In particular, we will look forward to the opportunities and challenges that come with the rise of great powers. In this case, we will play the parts of the incumbent “hegemon”–the United States of America–and the “rising” power–the People’s Republic of China. Specifically, we will develop long-term strategic plans–what is often called “Grand Strategy”–across three substantive issue areas: security; economic relations; and the environment.
Power transition is as old as international relations itself. Indeed, Thucydides explained the origins of the Peloponnesian War thus: “The Lacedaemonians voted that…war must be declared…because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians…” Book I, Ch III: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7142/7142-h/7142-h.htm#link2HCH0003 )
Recently, Graham Allison has applied this logic to the case of the Rise of China today:
We have also considered several of these major transitions in our course thus far. We saw that the rise of new imperial rivals at the end of the nineteenth century–Germany; Imperial Japan; and the United States–threatened to destabilise the UK-led international order. And, from some perspectives, it led to the First World War. Certainly, it ripened conditions for such a conflict. But we also observed the peaceful “torch passing” from the United Kingdom to the United States in the interwar period. Thus, one expects–one hopes!–that violence is not inevitable.
At the same time, the conditions of international life are different in some profound respects. Is true that our current era of globalisation mirrors the economic integration that defined the global order prior to the First World War. But the security situation today now includes intercontinental ballistic missiles, a host of other types of weapons of mass destruction, and cyber-warfare. All of this makes conflict vastly easier and, as McNamara warned, perilously rapid. At the same time, climate change makes the timeless questions of scarcity more poignant–and less tractable–than at any other point in modern history. Suffice it to say, the future of our species depends upon responding proactively to climate change. Yet, it is tragic that the most robust responses to climate change–reversing globalization, limiting population growth, and reducing consumption rates–are precisely the kinds of things that often lead to violent conflict and, potentially, devastating war.
So, we ask…
Will the rise of China, and the fear this inspires in the West, drive us into World War III? Or will the Western powers–and the United States in particular–do what it takes to accommodate a new, illiberal major player like China at the helm of global leadership?
The answers to these questions depend crucially on the specifics of these powers–on their people and on their leaders. But this also takes us to the bigger questions about power transition, global leadership, and the future of liberalism more broadly. There could–and should–be lessons from these considerations that can be applied to any power hoping to shape the global order of the future–from India to Ireland, from Brazil to Botswana, and from Spain to Senegal.
Preparation
As usual, I deliberately minimise the preparatory work for our simulations. Prior to the simulation, all students need do is to sign up for a role on the course moodle.
Previously, we discussed the previous power transitions (discussed above). Students may wish to review those lectures and readings prior to the simulation.
We have also read and discussed some of the key documents that gave rise to the West’s “grand strategy” of containment in the context of the Cold War. These include: Kennan’s “Long Telegram;” Kennan’s Foreign Affairs articles; US National Security Council document 68 (“NSC-68”); and Churchill’s “Sinews of Peace” speech. These documents (from lecture & seminar 8) will provide some examples of the kind, and level, of thinking that comprises grand strategy.
For those who are keen, the links throughout provide some background, context, and further reading. They also may prove useful during the simulation itself.
Scenario
The high level talks this week in Anchorage between China and the United States have not gone well. Yang Jiechi, one of China’s top foreign policy officials, broke diplomatic protocols by giving an extended “tirade” against the United States. This prompted the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, to issue an extended response–with all the world’s media invited to watch–criticising China and defending the US’s “rules-based order.”
This is the latest airing of a rift that has been developing for some time. In 2010, Yang defended China’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea, reportedly informing Singapore’s foreign minister (among others) that, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries; and that’s just a fact.” More recently, Blinken has accused China of perpetrating a “genocide” in its polices against the (1 million) Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Western China).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bn86mlXraj4
Imagine that, in response, your government has formed a Grand Strategy Planning Committee (GSPC) tasked with formulating a robust strategy in three critical areas: security; economic relations; and the environment. Given your experience studying the evolution of global order over the last two centuries, you have been called to serve on this committee. Your job is to craft the grand strategy that will define your country’s actions going forward–from decisions about domestic economic policies, to your approach to international negotiations, to your plans to work with, through, and outside of international regimes.
Simulation Structure
Each country will have a GSPC divided into three subcommittees. Each of those subcommittees will have a team of two students. There will also be a chairperson for each of the two GSPCs. Students will register in advance via Moodle.
Each actor’s objective is to maximise his or her preferences, whatever preferences those might be, however they are (re)formed. To do so, actors will not merely develop and employ their own strategies but must also adapt those strategies to the work of the members of their country’s other subcommittees and to the directives set out by the committee chairperson.
Schedule
- 1400 introduction.
- 1405 drafting: subcommittees formulate strategies using prompt 1.
- 1430 drafting: subcommittees formulate strategies using prompt 2.
- 1450 drafting: subcommittees formulate strategies using prompt 3.
- 1505 espionage! cyber-warfare reveals the grand strategy of the other side; countries reconsider their strategies.
- 1515 debriefing: chair of USA’s GSPC presents USA’s reflections.
- 1520 debriefing: chair of China’s GSPC presents China’s reflections.
- 1525 group discussion and conclusions.
Drafting
Responsibilities of the Subcommittees
Working as a team, each subcommittee will meet in its own breakout room, drafting its grand strategy in three phases, using the following three prompts.
Prompt 1: what are the specific results you hope to accomplish; what tools and techniques will you use to achieve them; and what is your timeline for pursuing them?
Prompt 2: what are the specific objectives you expect the rival power to pursue; what means do you expect them to employ; and what do you think their timeline will be?
Prompt 3: where is the greatest overlap (i.e. compatibility) in your aims and those of the rival power; where is the greatest source of tension (i.e. incompatibility); and what will you prioritise as a result?
You should recognise these as, essentially, the questions that George Kennan posed, and answered, in his own grand strategy of “containment” (in the Foreign Affairs articles that we read in session 8). Similarly, remember Robert McNamara’s insistence on the importance of empathising with the perspective of the other side–as he did in the Cuban Missile Crisis but as he failed to do in the Vietnam War. Consider also the role of empathy in transforming the relationship between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger–and, consequently, between the US and China–in the summer of 1971.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/
The moodle has a wiki page for each actor. You should put your text there so that other actors can review it, as specified in the simulation schedule/timeline.
Responsibilities of the Chairperson
While the subcommittees are working, each country’s committee chair will bounce between their country’s subcommittee breakout rooms to provide the overall vision and ensure coherence. After all, it would not be a very “grand” strategy to have the economic planners assuming economic cooperation while the military planners are plotting a preventive war! So, the chair will be responsible for giving a clear steer to the subcommittees as they work.
It is expected that the chairperson will ask the subcommittees to rework their elements of the strategy to ensure consistency and alignment. In contrast to simulation 3–in which the text was drafted in one fell swoop–this simulation will involve an iterative process. Thus, the text of the grand strategies should continue to evolve over the course of the simulation.
Espionage
In this stage, each country will be allowed to read the other country’s grand strategy. (they should not access the other team’s strategy prior to this!).
At this point, each country will have to reconsider its grand strategy in light of these revelations. The chairperson should lead this discussion among the subcommittees. The participants may modify their grand strategy if they wish.
Debriefing
Here the “simulation” portion ends, and we work together to draw some broader conclusions about the process that has unfolded. First, each chairperson will be debriefed for 5 minutes–meaning, he or she will share some reflections. The purpose here is not to present or advance the grand strategy as much as to share insights into the experience of crafting that strategy.
The chairperson might share reflections on:
- how difficult was it to achieve coherence and consistency across the different issue areas?
- how did you set priorities across the different issue areas?
- what method(s) did you use to “empathise” with the leadership of the other country?
- what was the effect of the revelations (of the other country’s strategy) on your own strategy and thinking?
This will lead into a more general discussion among the whole group.
Actor Roles and Concerns
China
Chairperson
- formulate a clear strategic vision.
- ensure that the subcommittees’ plans are consistent rather than conflicting.
- maximise national interests without provoking the United States.
Subcommittee on Security
- how to preserve the centrality of the Chinese Communist Party.
- how to credibly signal peaceful intentions.
- how to roll back American deployments to create greater space for China’s military expansion.
Subcommittee on Economic Relations
- how to maintain rapid economic growth and stability.
- rebalancing: shift away from reliance on exports; encourage consumption in Western China to reduce East/West inequality.
- secure access to vital markets abroad: resource extraction; outlets for Chinese labour and investment.
Subcommittee on the Environment
- mitigate climate change.
- ensure that international climate change agreements place burdens principally on those countries who have, across the last several centuries, benefited the most from carbon-intensive industrialisation.
- reduce dependence on foreign energy sources.
USA
Chairperson
- formulate a clear strategic vision.
- ensure that the subcommittees’ plans are consistent rather than conflicting.
- anticipate and pre-empt China’s strategy.
Subcommittee on Security
- how to protect US allies in the region (e.g. Taiwan; South Korea; Japan).
- how to promote democracy and human rights in China (especially in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet).
- how to credibly deter China from challenging US interests and values in other regions (e.g. Middle East; Africa; and Latin America).
Subcommittee on Economic Relations
- how to prevent China from destabilising the US-led liberal international order.
- how to retain global economic centrality.
- how to ensure full employment despite China’s increasing industrial dominance.
Subcommittee on the Environment
- mitigate climate change.
- ensure that international climate change agreements do not simply “soak the rich” countries, such as the US and its wealthy allies.
- ensure that international climate change agreements are enforceable.